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Abstract 
Though auctions show a prevailing dominance in electronic markets, our understanding of how 
auctions affect human behaviour is still rather limited. In this paper we analyse the impact of 
emotional processes on the decision making of human agents in electronic auctions. The analysis is 
based on a physio-economic study, in which human agents take part in a Dutch auction experiment, 
while their physiological parameters are recorded simultaneously. Parameters evaluated in this study 
are the electrodermal activity and the heart rate of the experiment participants. Based on the 
physiological results, we conclude that human agents tend to cognitively set a price at which they 
want to end the auction, but once they reach that specific price, they are tempted due to emotional 
processes to wait a little longer in order to increase their nominal payoff. Further we argue that the 
adaption of psychophysiological methodologies is not limited to mechanism design, but can be of 
considerable assistance for successful design of information systems in general. 
Keywords: Auction, Emotion, Design Research Methods & Methodologies, Market Engineering, 
Physio-Economics 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The rapid penetration of Information and Communication Technologies has also effected into a raise 
of auction mechanisms. Be it transactions between businesses, consumers, the public administration or 
any combination of these, auctions are the primary coordination mechanism, which establishes 
dynamic prices. The number of electronic market platforms based on auctions is expected to further 
grow with no end in sight. Amazon, eBay and SupplyOn are just a few prominent examples for the 
very successful use of auctions in electronic markets. Auctions have been used for the transaction of 
nearly any imaginable good for several centuries, but their ever-growing and omnipresent use in 
electronic commerce worldwide is conspicuous. 
Even more surprising than the fact that auctions play such a dominant role in electronic business is 
that our understanding of how auctions work on human behaviour is still rather limited. A substantial 
literature in the field of game theory tries to explain auctions from an analytical point of view. 
Economic theory typically describes auctions as non-cooperative games with asymmetric information 
and provides the market participants (or agents) with a set of normative rules in order to maximize 
their expected payoff. Correspondingly, agents are assumed to behave rationally in these type of 
models. Nevertheless experiments in the laboratory and in the field show that the theoretically derived 
models – though mathematically sound and sophisticated – are not rich enough to capture the 
behavioral component of auctions. When it comes to explain human behavior, it is imperative to 
understand the decision making process of the market participants in the first place. 
In this paper, we analyse the impact of emotions on the decision making of human agents in the Dutch 
auction. In a Dutch auction the auctioneer starts the auction by setting an initial high price. The 
auctioneer then continuously decreases the price until one of the bidders claims the good by accepting 
the current price. The bidder is then awarded with the good for the last announced price. The analysis 
is based on an experimental study in which human agents take part in a Dutch auction, while their 
physiological parameters are recorded simultaneously. By applying methodologies of 
psychophysiology and psychology, deeper insights into the decision making process and the emotional 
processing of the market participants can be gained. 
In this paper, we start from the intuition that decision making is both a cognitive and an affective 
process. It comprises strategic considerations of the agents concerning the maximization of their 
expected payoff on the one hand; rhese aspects are the main focus of auction theory today and are 
fairly well understood. On the other hand, however, there is an inevitable influence of affective or 
emotional processes that also have a strong impact on the decision making process. Undisputadely, the 
decisions of human agents are not fully goverend by rational considerations alone. Recent research 
addresses the fact that there is a significant correlation between emotion and the economic behaviour 
of agents. Putting it to the extreme, Bechara & Damasio (2005) argue that taking advantageous 
decisions is only possible in consequence of a prior accurate emotional processing. Various other 
studies in the field of neuro-economics and of physio-economics (e.g. Gonzales, Dana et al. 2005, 
Rilling, Sanfey et al. 2004, McCabe, Houser et a. 2001, Smith & Dickhaut 2005) substantiate the 
assumption that emotions have a crucial impact on the decision making process of human agents. Lo 
& Repin (2002) analyse the interrelation of somatic states like the skin conductance or the heart rate 
with market events on financial markets. Analysing the physiological parameters of traders on the 
stock exchange in the context of a field experiment, they found a significant correlation between 
changes in the price and return deviations as well as the maximum volatility with the increasing 
number of skin conductance responses and the average heart rate. 
In line with those studies, we argue that we need a research focus on the emotional aspects of decision 
making and of human interaction with information systems in general. Methodologies of 
psychophysiology have to be adapted to the needs of information systems research and experimental 
economics in order to gain a deeper understanding of human behaviour and its causes. Physiological 
parameters like the skin conductance or the heart rate provide objective parameters of the market 
participants that at least complement traditional techniques. Popular methodologies like the use of 
questionnaires and interviews often have to deal with the problem of subjectivity and social-
desirability bias. Furthermore the interviewed persons often find it very difficult to express their level 
of arousal by the mere use of words and scales. The elaborated use of physiological parameters offers 
the opportunity of a supplemental objective perspective, which appears to be a considerable 
enrichment for the understanding of human decision making. It is important to mention that the 
analysis of physiological parameters can act as complement to questionnaires rather than a substitute. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we highlight considerations regarding 
the strategic behaviour of agents in the Dutch auction and point out how this translates to emotional 
processes. In section 3 we point out the psychophysiological parameters used for the analysis of 
participants’ arousal, before section 4 presents the experimental design that underlies this study.  In 
section 5 we present and interpret the results of our study. Section 6 concludes and provides an 
outlook on future physio-economic studies in the field of auction design. 
2 BIDDING IN THE DUTCH AUCTION 
In Dutch auctions, the auctioneer sets an initial high price and then gradually decreases the price for 
the commodity until one of the bidders accepts the current price. Technically speaking the Dutch 
auction is a descending auction with a first-price mechanism, meaning that the buyer pays the price 
she actually bid for the good. The Dutch auction originally obtained its name from the flower market 
in Amsterdam, which is based on that specific auction mechanism. The Dutch auction is especially 
interesting due to its theoretically equivalence to the first-price sealed-bid auction, in which each of 
the participants submits exactly one sealed bid and the highest bidder gets the commodity for the price 
she has bid in the first place. Although the mechanisms are, independent of the participants’ risk 
attitude, theoretically equivalent, they systematically lead to different market outcomes in experiments 
(e.g. Milgrom 1989). We propose that this difference can be attributed to the increased degree of 
arousal of the participants in the Dutch auction due to its dynamic characteristic. 
 
Figure 1. The decrement of the price in the Dutch auction over the time. The auction starts off at 
an initial high price pmax and hypothetically ends at t=tmax if no bids were submitted. 
Auctions are typically analyzed by means of game theory, where best-response strategies are 
identified. From a strategic point of view, it is very important to specify assumptions regarding the 
valuations of the bidders participating. Typically three classes of valuations are distinguished: (1) 
common values, (2) independent private values and (3) affiliated values (Milgrom & Weber 1982). In 
this study we focus on the case when the commodity has the same common value for each of the 
auction participants. Often agents do not observe the common value precisely, but only some 
(uniform) statistical distribution of it. A very prominent example of the common value assumption is 
the sale of oil drilling rights, in which each of the auction participants has the same marginal costs for 
extracting the oil, but no one exactly knows how much oil can actually be extracted and therefore how 
high the common value of the oil drilling rights is. The winner of a common value auction usually 
tends to overestimate the real value of the commodity, since all other bidders had a lower estimate. 
This phenomenon is commonly known as the “winner’s curse” (Kagel & Levin 1986, Wolfstetter 
1994). To exclude the effect of the “winner’s curse” regarding the value of the commodity in our 
analysis, the exact common value v is made known to all agents participating in advance. 
The decrement of the price in a Dutch auction over the time is depicted in figure 1. The auction starts 
off at t=0 with the initial high price pmax and hypothetically ends at t=tmax with the price 0, if no bidder 
submitted a valid bid in the meantime. The common value v is reached by the time tv. A fully rational 
agent would submit a bid and consequently stop the auction at a price just below the common value v. 
However the payoff of the agent if she obtains the commodity for a price just below v is converging to 
zero. Therefore we assume that in this specific setting, each auction participant i sets a price pi0 at 
which she intends to bid for the commodity and consequently end the auction. Taking all prices pi0 of 
the agents into account, we expect an average price of p0. That is the price the agents would bid in the 
strategically equivalent first-price sealed bid-auction, in which each agent submits a single bid in a 
sealed envelope and the highest bidder gets the commodity for the price she bid. We assume that each 
agent cognitively considers these aspects before the Dutch auction starts and ends up with her price 
pi0. 
The probability of winning the Dutch auction over the bidding-price is depicted in figure 2. We 
assume that the probability has a convex characteristic between 0 and the price p0. This seems 
reasonable, as it is gradually unlikely to win the auction at a price below p0. In contrast we assume a 
concave characteristic in the interval between p0 and the common value v, since participants want to 
gain at least some minimum payoff v minus p0. It seems more than plausible that the probability of 
winning the auction with a bidding-price between v and pmax is 1, because such a price would result in 
a negative payoff for the winner. Here it becomes clear why the common value regarding the value of 
the commodity has been set to a fixed value. Hence, bidding above v – which may cause the “winner’s 
curse” effect – has been excluded in this specific setting. 
 
Figure 2. The probability of winning the auction and the expected payoff of the auction 
participants. The expected payoff has its maximum at the price p0. 
However, when the auction has started and gradually reaches the time t0, we assume that an emotional 
process begins inside the human agents, which results in prices below p0. The auction participants 
might be tempted to wait a little longer and set a new price p1 and a corresponding time t1 in order to 
gain a higher payoff than the minimum payoff. This reassessment of the bidding-price might 
iteratively occur until one bidder decides to stop the auction. The probability of winning the auction 
however, has a convex characteristic in the interval between 0 and v. Thus, the expected payoff for all 
auction participants is decreasing over time while the nominal payoff for the winner increases. The 
expected payoff is illustrated in the figure as the gray area and obviously it reaches its maximum at p0.  
The behaviour of waiting for the nominal payoff to further increase while the expected payoff 
decreases at the same time cannot be explained with cognitive or rational behaviour alone. We 
interpret this behaviour as some kind of “auction fever” as it has already been observed in English 
Auctions under different circumstances (Ku, Malhotra & Murnighan 2005, Heyman, Orhun & Ariely 
2004, Abele, Ehrhart & Ott 2006). We claim that affective or emotional processes, induced by the 
iterative mechanism of the Dutch auction, are responsible for the lower results. This might also 
explain why the Dutch auction yields on average lower revenues for the seller compared to the 
strategically equivalent first-price sealed-bid auction in laboratory experiments (e.g. Milgrom 1989). 
This behaviour cannot be explained satisfactorily yet by classical auction theory, which assumes fully 
rational agents that are not affected by emotional processes at all. A fundamental understanding of the 
decision making process with all its facets is indispensible though for the design of electronic market 
platforms. The market engineer has to design the market microstructure with respect to the presumed 
behaviour of the agents in order to achieve the specified objectives of the market (Weinhardt & 
Neumann 2003). If the understanding of the agent behaviour is rather limited though, the market 
outcome may deviate considerably from these objectives and even result in massive losses. Therefore, 
an elaborate market design, which is essential for a successful electronic market, has to consider the 
emotional aspects of human decision making as well. 
We claim that in order to gain a deeper understanding of these emotional aspects, we have to adapt 
psychophysiological methodologies to the field of experimental economics and information systems 
research. In contrast to the mere use of questionnaires and interviews, which often have to deal with 
the problem of subjectivity and social-desirability bias, the analysis of physiological parameters offers 
the intriguing opportunity to examine objective parameters that show a strong correlation to emotional 
processes of human agents. In the next section we will present the physiological parameters used in 
this study and point out the implications of their use for the experimental design. 
3 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL EVALUATION 
In this study we focus on the psychophysiological analysis of the electrodermal activity and the heart 
rate of to experiment participants in order to gain a deeper insight into the decision making process of 
human agents. These physiological parameters are well known in psychophysiology as excellent 
indicators of arousal and emotionality (Dawson, Schell & Filion 2000; Brownley, Hurwitz & 
Schneidermann 2000). Moreover, their relevance for human decision making has already been 
substantiated in several physio-economic studies (Lo & Repin 2002; Smith & Dickhaut 2005). It is 
important to state though that, just like other physio-economic studies (e.g. Smith & Dickhaut 2005, 
Lo & Repin 2002), we cannot distinguish between the different categories of emotions, e.g. fear, 
anger, sadness, joy, in this analysis. We can however determine the arousal of the market participants; 
various studies (e.g. Sinha, Lovallo & Parsons 1992) show that there is a strong link between emotions 
and arousal. 
3.1 The electrodermal activity 
Electrodermal activity is a generic term for the different electrical characteristics of the human skin: 
skin potential, skin admittance, skin impedance, skin resistance and skin conductance. Most relevant 
for psychophysiological research are particularly the skin resistance and its reciprocal value, i.e. the 
skin conductance. They are exosomatically measured by applying a very small electric current on the 
human skin. In this paper we emphasize the analysis of the skin conductance. 
The skin conductance of human agents has a typical range between 2 µS and 20 µS and shows a strong 
variation between the different subjects. The characteristic of the skin conductance is distinguished 
into a tonic level, meaning the absolute level of the skin conductance, when there is no phasic 
response, and into phasic increases, referred to as responses. The tonic level is denoted as the skin 
conductance level (SCL) and can be interpreted as the absolute level of arousal in relation to the basic 
level of the individual subject. In contrast the phasic increases are denoted as the skin conductance 
responses (SCR), which can either be specific to an identifiable stimulus or nonspecific, if such a 
stimulus cannot be identified. For a comprehensive breakdown of the electrodermal activity please 
refer to Boucsein (1992) and Dawson, Schell & Filion (2000). 
In this paper we focus especially on the SCL as an indicator for the overall arousal of the auction 
participants. We presume that it is only slightly increasing from the point when the auction starts until 
the price p0. From that on, we expect a significant increase of the SCL that finally reaches its 
maximum when one of the agents ends the auction by accepting the current price. That would strongly 
substantiate the assumption that the human agents are tempted to bid below the price p0 although their 
expected payoff rapidly decreases. 
3.2 The heart rate 
The heart rate is another physiological parameter that is well suitable for analysing the arousal of 
human agents. Lo & Repin (2002) analyse several physiological parameters, ranging from skin 
conductance, to body temperature, the respiration and the heart rate, in the context of stock traders and 
find correlates particularly for the skin conductance and the heart rate. Smith & Dickhaut (2005) point 
out the importance of emotions for institutional design using the heart rate in their analysis. In our 
analysis we focus particularly on the average heart rate (AHR) of the auction participants as an 
indicator for the degree of excitement. As well as for the SCL, we expect the AHR to increase 
significantly from the price p0 on.  
3.3 Implications for the experiment 
In order to analyse the SCL and the AHR there has to be a rest period of approximately four minutes 
before each Dutch auction. During that rest period the SCL decreases to some basic level that varies 
from subject to subject. Moreover, the auction is designed in a way that reduces the impact of novelty 
at the beginning of the auction session. The auction starts off at an initial high price that is 
considerably above the common value v, leaving the auction participants a sufficient period of time to 
get acquainted to the auction environment. Since bidding above v results in a negative payoff, the 
analysis of the physiological parameters starts from the price v at time tv on.  
Further a rather long interval of five seconds for each step in the Dutch auction is set with respect to 
enabling the psychophysiological evaluation. A clear trade-off turns out here. On the one side there is 
the need for long intervals between the relevant stimuli that can be mapped to the SCRs. On the other 
hand the auction participants should not get bored during the experiment, because that would very 
likely have an impact on their decision behaviour. The selected interval of five seconds seems to be a 
good solution here. 
Extending experimental economics by methods of psychophysiology inherently results in a reduced 
number of observations. The experiments demand supplemental preparation time for each individual 
subject and the number of participants that can be measured simultaneously is limited as well due to 
technical restrictions of the measurement system. The rest periods further extend the experimental 
sessions and leave less time for additional sessions. The experimental design will be discussed in 
detail in the next section. 
4 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
4.1 General environment of the experiment 
The experiment has been conducted in a computer laboratory with undergraduate students with 
economic background. Inviting students for economic experiments is a common practice in 
experimental economics (e.g. Kagel 1995, Abele, Ehrhart & Ott 2006). Due to technical restrictions of 
the psychophysiological equipment, there have been a limited number of experiment participants. 
Altogether 8 participants have been invited to the experiment and were then assigned randomly into 
groups of two. Each group then played 3 Dutch auctions against each other, resulting in a total number 
of 24 observations. The ratio of female and male students is balanced. In order to reduce the influence 
on each other and minimize the number of measurement artefacts, the participants are isolated with a 
dividing wall during the experiment and are not allowed to move or speak. 
The participants receive an instruction sheet that is read out aloud by a neutral facilitator. Before the 
actual start of the experiment, the students have to successfully complete a quiz regarding the rules in 
order to verify comprehension. Before the instructions are handed out, the measuring technology for 
skin conductance and heart rate measurement has to be attached. This is very important to assure a 
sufficient residence time for the electrode gel. To further reduce the possibility of measurement 
artefacts and to ensure full attentiveness of the students for the experimental system, anything that 
could distract the participants is removed from the laboratory before the experiment. 
4.2 Structure of the experiment 
After all of the participants have successfully completed the quiz the actual experiment starts. As 
pointed out earlier, each group played 3 Dutch auctions together. The within-subject design did not 
lead to significant differences in the market outcome between the three different rounds; therefore the 
data will be analyzed jointly. Each auction session is divided into three consecutive stages. The first 
stage consists of a rest period in which the participants have to wait for four minutes. In order to 
analyse the physiological parameters and the arousal of the participants, such a rest period is 
indispensible (Dawson, Schell & Filion 2000). In the second stage the Dutch auction itself takes place, 
which is going to be discussed in detail in the next subsection. The first period of time in the Dutch 
auction is designed again in a way that reduces the degree of novelty for the participants, which leads 
to less measurement artifacts of the physiological parameters. After the auction was finished, the 
auction results are displayed to the participants in the third stage. 
4.3 The design of the Dutch auction 
In each auction the two participants bid for a commodity with a fixed common value v of 6.00 €. The 
auction starts at an initial high price pmax  = 7.00 € and then gradually decreases the price every 5 
seconds by 0.10 €. The common value v is reached after a period tv of 50 seconds, leaving the auction 
participants with a sufficient amount of time to get acquainted with the auction environment and thus 
reducing the impact of novelty to the physiological parameters. The auction ends after one of the 
bidders placed a valid bid by accepting the current announced price. If both agents simultaneously 
place a bid at a technologically indistinguishable point of time, the winner of the auction is determined 
randomly by a coin toss. The winner of the auction receives 6.00 € less her own bid. The students were 
paid off their accumulated personal payoff at the end of the experiment. This information is common 
knowledge to all auction participants before the auction was started. 
 
Figure 3. The experimental setup with the electronic market and the measurement system  
for the physiological parameters (EDA = electrodermal activity) 
As depicted in figure 3, the Dutch auction is implemented as a simplified electronic market on a single 
computer. The participants follow the auction on their monitor and can place a bid by pressing a single 
button. To exclude collusive behaviour, the students were not allowed to speak before or during the 
experiment, furthermore the group allocation as well as the position in the lab was randomly assigned. 
The auction computer and the measurement system were automatically adjusted using appropriate 
time synchronizing software. The measurement system comprised a constant-current amplifier for skin 
conductance measurement, using silver-silver chloride cup electrodes, and a heart rate recording kit. 
The electrodes for skin conductance were attached on the thenar and hypothenar eminences of the 
palm. 
5 RESULTS 
On average, each auction ended after tAVG = 180 seconds at a price pAVG of 3.30 €. Remarkably, this 
price is far below the price predicted by auction theory. A fully rational player would bid just below 
the common value v, yielding a payoff converging to zero. The analysis of the psychophysiological 
recordings impose the assumption that agents select their price pi0 in the interval between 4.30 € and 
4.60 €. This could be substantiated to some extent in interviews with the auction participants after the 
experiment. Based upon the considerations of section 2, we assume that the auction participants 
initially intend to end the auction at their individual price pi0. Having reached the price pi0 though, the 
agents are tempted to wait a little longer and thus increase the nominal payoff while decreasing their 
expected payoff. We assume that this irrational behaviour can be attributed to the excitement during 
the auction, which leads us to the following hypotheses: 
• Hypothesis H1. The slope of the skin conductance level of the auction participants in the 
interval between t0 and the end of the auction is greater than in the interval between tv and t0. 
• Hypothesis H2. The slope of the heart rate of the auction participants in the interval between t0 
and the end of the auction is greater than in the interval between tv and t0. 
In each case the null hypothesis is that the slopes are equal in both intervals. 
Of the 24 observation, only 15 could be evaluated for the analysis of the experiment due to technical 
difficulties and measurement artefacts. The typical characteristic of a skin conductance measurement, 
which could be observed during most of the Dutch auctions, is depicted in figure 5. One can see a 
strong SCR right after the start of the auction, which can be traced back mostly to novelty. Another 
strong SCR can be observed at the time tv, at which the auction for the first time results in a non-
negative payoff for the winning bidder. In the interval between tv and t0, the SCL increases only slowly 
and sometimes even shows a decreasing slope. In contrast, from the time t0 until the auction ends a 
strong increase of the SCL can be observed. 
 
Figure 5. Typical characteristic of a skin conductance measurement during the Dutch auction 
(SC = skin conductance) 
The null hypothesis was rejected in favour of H1 using a one-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test at 
the 99 percent confidence level. Thus, the slope of the skin conductance level in the interval between tv 
and t0 is significantly lower than the slope of the skin conductance in the interval between t0 and the 
end of the auction. The typical characteristic of a heart rate measurement, which could be observed 
during most of the Dutch auctions, is depicted in figure 6. As well as in the skin conductance 
measurement, one can see a clear increase of the heart rate from the time t0 on until the end of the 
auction. However, the null hypothesis could not be rejected in favour of H2 using the same test at the 
95 percent confidence level. We largely attribute this result to measurement artefacts and the small 
number of observations that could be evaluated. 
 
Figure 6. Typical characteristic of a heart rate measurement during the Dutch auction 
(AHR = average heart rate) 
6 CONCLUSION & OUTLOOK 
Based on the market results, the interviews and especially the physiological data, we conclude that due 
to emotional processes, the auction participants are tempted to prolong the Dutch despite their 
simultaneously decreasing expected payoff. We claim that this behaviour can be interpreted as some 
kind of “auction fever” and attribute it to the iterative characteristic of the Dutch auction. The increase 
of arousal can be substantiated by a significant increase of the skin conductance level. Though the 
evaluation of the heart rate shows no significant increase of arousal, it could nevertheless be observed 
in several measurements. We attribute this result to measurement artefacts and the overall small 
number of observations. 
Further we conclude that the adaption of psychophysiological methodologies to experimental 
economics and information systems research in general shows promising results for future studies. Of 
course physio-economic studies still have to deal with technological and methodological difficulties, 
which results in a small number of observations yet. We are very confident though to overcome these 
challenges and conduct future experiments with a greater number of observations. Especially for the 
design of electronic markets, a fundamental understanding of decision making with all its facets is 
indispensible for its success. We claim that physio-economic studies can provide a considerable 
contribution here. Based on our results, future experiments have to further analyse the impact of 
mechanism variations on the agents’ emotionality. We even argue that emotions are a major quality 
characteristic for electronic markets. Ebay even advertises to “make shopping exciting” in Australia or 
with “3.. 2.. 1.. mine” in Germany. Therefore it is vital to know how electronic markets can trigger 
emotions, and, perhaps even more importantly, how the triggered emotions affect the market outcome. 
It is important to state though that with EDA and AHR measurement, we can only determine the level 
of arousal of the market participants; we cannot distinguish between the different categories of 
emotions, e.g. fear, anger, sadness and joy. There is however a strong link between emotions and 
arousal (e.g. Sinha, Lovallo & Parsons 1992) and it is an important issue for future research to 
understand what kind of emotions are triggered by variations in the market mechanisms. We propose 
that this can be achieved by the sophisticated combination of psychophysiological methodologies and 
questionnaires. For our analysis though, it is only important that emotions in general have a significant 
influence on the behavior of market participants in electronic auctions. 
Moreover, the use of psychophysiological methodologies is not limited to mechanism design alone. It 
may also be applied for the comparison of electronic markets and information systems in general. 
Recent studies show that the design of the information system has an impact on the market outcome as 
well, even if the markets use the exact same market mechanism (Kersten et al. 2007, Kolitz 2007). 
Thus the design of an electronic market must not be limited to the microstructure and the business 
structure, but has to comprise a sophisticated approach for the information system design as well. The 
different outcomes of identical market mechanisms cannot be explained with auction theory and thus 
are most probably related to the agents’ arousal. Therefore, physio-economic methodologies can be of 
considerable assistance for the information systems design of electronic markets as well. 
Correspondingly, we argue that the adaption of psychophysiological methodologies is not limited to 
electronic markets alone, but can be applied to any kind of information system with human interaction. 
In complementary combination with sophisticated interviews and questionnaires, a deeper 
understanding of the users’ emotional processes can be gained, which is undoubtedly essential for an 
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